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STATE TAXATION OF RESIDENT TRUSTEE
Greenough v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport'
The testator, a New York resident, executed a will
which established a trust consisting of shares of capital
stock in a New Jersey corporation., The life beneficiary of
the trust was a resident of New York and the stock certificates constituting the corpus of the trust fund were
physically located in that state.2 The will was duly probated in New York and a court of that state granted letters of trusteeship to co-trustees, one a resident of that
state and the other domiciled in Rhode Island. Although
ancillary letters testamentary were issued and a copy of
the will was recorded in Rhode Island, the resident trustee
did not exercise any of his powers as trustee in Rhode
Island. As per a statute of that state,' a personal property
ad valorem tax was assessed by the City of Newport
against the resident trustee upon one-half of the value
of the corpus of the trust. The co-trustees paid the tax
and instituted suit in a Rhode Island court to recover the
tax. The lower court dismissed the petition and a bill of
exceptions was overruled by the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island.4
On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the dismissal of the petition by a five to four
decision with Mr. Justice Reed delivering the opinion, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter writing a separate concurring opinion,
and with Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Rutledge,
Jackson, and Murphy dissenting.
Throughout these proceedings the appellants argued
that to tax the resident co-trustee an amount measured by
1331 U. S. 486, 67 S. Ct. 1400 (1947). See Note, Tazation-Power to Tax;
Where Property May Be Taxed-State in Which Trustee Resides May Tax
Him on Intangibles of Out-of-State Trust, (1947) 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1169, and
Note, State Power to Taw Intangible Property-Due Process (1947) 47 Col.
L. Rev. 865.
I Rhode Island, New York, and New Jersey, which are the three states
that have contacts in this case, all have the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
3 General Laws of Rhode Island 1938, Oh. 30, Sec. 9: "Fifth. Intangible
personal property held in trust by any executor, administrator, or trustee,
whether under an express or implied trust, the Income of which is to be
paid to any other person, shall be taxed to such executor, administrator,
or trustee in the town where such other person resides; but if such other
person resides out of the state, then in the town where the executor, administrator, or trustee, resides; and if there be more than one such executor, administrator, or trustee, then in equal proportions to each of such
executors, administrators, and trustees in the towns where they respectively reside."
I Greenough v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport, 71 R. I. 477, 47 A. 2d
625 (1946).
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the intangible personal property of the trust all of which
was outside of Rhode Island and to which that state gave
no protection or benefit was unconstitutional under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The appellants therefore claimed that
Rhode Island could not tax the proportionate part of these
intangibles of the trust merely because the resident cotrustee was a resident of Rhode Island.
In the opinion of the court delivered by Mr. Justice
Reed the court decreed that Rhode Island, by making its
courts available for suits by and against the resident trustee in regard to trust matters, had the power to levy the
tax. The resident trustee by his legal interest in the trust
was held to have sufficient ownership interest in the intangibles to allow the state to tax him. This opinion was
delivered by four members of the court. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion to form a majority.
He stated that Rhode Island in taxing its residents for the
advantage of living within the state could use as a measure "the wealth which a person controls, whatever his
ultimate beneficial interest in the property".' Mr. Justice
Frankfurter also stated that Rhode Island could tax its
residents for acting in a trusteeship capacity.
This case is rather startling evidence of the present
tendency of the Supreme Court to recognize fewer restrictions upon the state power to tax intangibles. Supreme Court decisions consistently hold that the due
process clause prevents a state from taxing a resident on
his real and tangible personal property located outside of
the jurisdiction of the taxing state.'
In regard to the state taxation of intangible property
the Supreme Court, however, has had difficulty with questions of the jurisdictional situs of the intangibles, and
whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would permit several states to tax certain interests
in the same intangible property. In the Farmer'sLoan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota7 case the court applied the maxim,
mobilia sequuntur personam, to hold "that in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile of their
owner and we can find no sufficient reason for saying that
they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against taxaB67 S. Ct. 1400, 1407 (1947).
SUnion Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905);
Prick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925). See also, Anno.-Peronal
Property-itu8 for Taxation, 123 A. L. R. 179.
7 280 U. S. 204 (1930); See Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1902)
which was expressly overruled by this case.
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tion at more than one place similar to that accorded
tangibles"." Two years later the First National Bank of
Boston v. Maine' case held that to levy an inheritance tax
on certificates of stock that were within the taxing state,
although the owner was a non-resident decedent, infringed
upon the Fourteenth Amendment. In following the doctrine laid down by the Farmer'sLoan case, the Court said:
"We conclude that shares of stock, like other intangibles,
constitutionally can be subject to a death transfer tax by
one state only."' 10 But signs of a breakdown in the single
tax rule of these cases were already appearing. In the
First National Bank of Boston case, Mr. Justice Stone,
joined by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented, stating that they believed the due process clause
was being unduly stretched to cover the case. The dissenting justices said "Situs of an intangible, for taxing
purposes. . . is not a dominating reality, but a convenient
fiction which may be judicially employed or discarded,
according to the result desired"."
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Stone delivered
the opinion of the Court in Curry v. McCanless 12 some
seven years after the First National Bank of Boston case.
The McCanless case in effect reversed the holding of the
majority of the Court in the FirstNational Bank of Boston
case. This is a strong indication of the belief that the individual opinions of the Supreme Court's remaining members have not changed but the shifting of the Court's
opinion on this question has been the result of a change
in the personnel of the Court. 3
In Curry v. McCanless, the Court pointed out that,
when a taxpayer of X state extends his activities with
respect to his intangibles into Y state which gives him
the protection and benefit of the laws of Y state, the application of the so called single place of taxation rule
should not hinder Y state's constitutional power to tax.
This, the Court continues, could be based on the power to
tax as "an incident of sovereignty, and . . .co-extensive
with that which it is an incident. All subjects over which
the sovereign power of a state extends, are objects of
8

Ibid, 212.
S284 U. S. 312 (1932).

1
IbiS, 328.
11

Ibid, 332.
12 307 U. S. 357 (1939).

11 See Howard, State Juraiction to Tax IntatWible8: A Twvelve Year
Cycle (1943) 8 Mo. L. Rev. 155. See also, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Graves v. New York, 306 U. S. 466 (1939).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. IX

taxation", as stated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCullouch v. Maryland," or it could be based on the benefit
and protection afforded by the taxing state. Here the
Court admitted, "consequently there.., are many circumstances in which more than one state may have jurisdiction to impose a tax and measure it by some or all of the
[non-resident] taxpayer's intangibles"." The Court stated
that on the facts of the Curry case in regard to the tax assessed by the decedent's domicile [Tennessee] and the
trustee's domicile [Alabama] on the transfer of a trust of
intangibles, "We can find nothing in the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment and no support in reason, principle, or authority for saying that it prohibits either state,
in the circumstances of this case, from laying the tax".16
It should be noted that in this case the administration of
the trust was conducted in both Alabama and Tennessee.
The subsequent case of State Tax Commission of Utah
v. Aldrich" expressly overruled First National Bank of
Boston v. Maine. Ta In the Aldrich case a New York resident owned stock in a Utah corporation. Upon the death
of the New York resident, Utah imposed a death transfer
tax upon the stock even though the certificates representing those shares were physically within New York. In a
seven to two decision with Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr.
Justice Roberts dissenting, the Court upheld Utah's
power to tax the transfer of the Utah corporation's stock
even though the certificates of stock and owner thereof
were outside of the state, based on the reasoning that the
corporation owed its existence to Utah and the nature
and extent of the individual stockholder's interest was defined by Utah law. The Court follows the Curry v. McCanless case and concludes that "there is no constitutional
rule of immunity from taxation of intangibles by more
than one state".'8
The Aldrich case results in the complete adoption of
the present rule now followed by the Supreme Court, a
rule which was introduced in the Curry v. McCanless case
although at that time the First National Bank of Boston
case was not expressly overruled. Based on this current
doctrine of the Supreme Court that the jurisdictional
144 Wheat. 316 (1819).

:5
Supra, n. 12, 368.
6
S upra, n. 12, 372.
"316 U. S. 174 (1942).
17* Supra, n. 9.
8Ibid, 181.
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power is the only constitutional test necessary in the field
of state taxation of intangibles, the Greenough case deals
with the further question of what is sufficient benefit and
protection over intangible property to give the state jurisdiction so to tax.
In the Greenough case, the taxing state levied a personal property tax measured by the value of a foreign
trust of intangibles upon a resident co-trustee where the
taxing state's only contact was the residence of one of the
trustees. In the opinion, the Court, in discussing state
taxation of out of state intangibles belonging to a resident
owner, said "the states unrestricted by the federal Constitution have been accustomed to assess property taxes
upon intangibles 'wherever held or deposited' belonging
to their citizens". 9 Then the Court stated that there is
more reason for the domiciliary state of the owner of intangibles to collect a property tax on the intangibles than
any other taxing jurisdiction because the intangibles are
under the immediate control of the owner who is benefited
and protected by the domiciliary state. The Court qualifies
these statements by admitting that taxing jurisdictions
other than the state of the owner's domicile may also have
the power to tax these same intangibles and refers to
19 a At this point the Court posed the
Curry v. McCanless.
question as to whether the same relationship as exists
between an owner and his intangibles, exists between a
trustee and the intangibles of a trust.
The Court in answering this question divides "the
entity" of the trust into two separate interests; one, the
equitable interest that the beneficiary of the trust has in
the trust res, and, two, the legal interest in the trust res
20
which is a distinct right held or owned by the trustee.
As to the status of this legal interest, the trustee as the
owner of this legal interest in the res may incur personal
obligations in the administration of the trust which are
enforceable against him.2 It was admitted that the resident as trustee had received no specific benefit or protection from Rhode Island to date but the Court thought
that Rhode Island's keeping its courts available for furnishing aid to the trustee constituted in. itself a benefit and
protection and concluded that "the resident trustee was
the possessor of interest in the intangibles, sufficient ...
19

Spra, n. 5, 1403.

19, Supra, n. 12.
20
2'

1 ScOTT, TRusTs (1939) Sec. 88.1.
2 Scow, TRusTs (1939) See. 261.
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to support a proportional tax for the benefit and protection
afforded by Rhode Island".2 2
The fact that there were co-trustees, only one of whom
was a resident of the taxing state, was not considered
significant by the Court, but Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent pointed out that, if the majority be correct, Rhode
Island's only taxing a proportionate one-half of the estate
was merely an act of grace, and that, since any one of a
number of trustees holds a power over all of the trust,
Rhode Island could tax the entire value of the trust corpus
if it had the power to tax it at all.
Mr. Justice Rutledge with whom Mr. Chief Justice Vinson concurred stated that whether or not due process forbids
state taxation of property is a practical matter and a question of degree depending on factual connections and that
"I do not think the mere fact that one of a number of trustees resides in a state, without more, is a sufficiently substantial connection to justify a levy by that state upon the
trust corpus, by an ad valorem tax either fractional or on
the entirety of the res".2 3 As was suggested by the dissents, the fact that Rhode Island has kept its courts available for suits by and against the resident trustee is not particularly significant because the same benefit and protection would be afforded a non-resident trustee in the same
courts.
Although the appellants specifically disclaimed any reliance on the argument that Rhode Island's assessment
might subsequently result in a multistate taxation of the
trust and although the opinion of the Court had nothing
to say about the probability of this occurring, the growing
problem of multistate taxation of intangibles and the interests thereof was touched upon by Mr. Justice Jackson
in his dissent. There has been a great volume of writings
and opinions upon multistate taxation of intangibles. 4
22Supra, n. 5, 1406. The Court also noted and discussed Goodsite v.
Lane, 139 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905). In the Goodsite case the Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a foreign trust consisting of intangibles which
had received no benefit whatsoever from the taxing state could not have
a state property tax levied against it merely because the trustee resided
in the taxing state. The Court, however, in the Greenough case did not
believe that the above decision gave proper recognition to the state's power
to tax the owner of the legal interest in the trust res.
2 Supra, n. 5, 1408. Also note, as stated in State Power To Tax Ivtangfble Property-Due Proce8, &upra,n. 1, 867: "In addition, it (the
Greenough decision) ignored the opportunity to provide more specific
vriteria for determination of a state's power to tax."
24 See Fraught, Reciprooity in State Taxation as the Next Step il
Empirical Legislation (1944) 92 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 258: Howard, State
Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles: A Twelve Year Cycle (1943) 8 Mo. L. Rev.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that multistate taxation may occur. This was recognized in the unanimous
opinion of the court delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
in Massachusetts v. Missouri,2 5 that "the validity of each
claim [of the two states to apply their respective inheritance taxes to the transfer of the same trust] is wholly
independent of that of the other and, in the light of our
recent decisions, may constitutionally be pressed by each
state without conflict in point of fact or law with the decision of the other".2 6 Mr. Justice Douglas writing the
majority opinion in State Tax Commission of Utah v.
Aldrich,2 a stated "More basically, even though we believed
that a different system should be designed to protect
against multiple taxation, it is not our province to provide
it".2 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in
the Aldrich case summed up the problem by stating
"whether a tax is wise or expedient is the business of the
political branches of government, not ours. Considerations
relevant to invalidation of a tax measure are wholly different from those that come into play in justifying disapproval of a tax on the score of political or financial wisdom.
It may well be that the last word has not been said by
the various devices now available-through uniform and
reciprocal legislation, through action by the states under
the Compact Clause, Art. 1, Sec. 10, Cl. 3, or through whatever other means statesmen may devise... "2s
The general impression that can be reached from opinions such as these is that unwholesome though constitutional multistate taxation may be eliminated by uniform
or reciprocal legislation by the political branches of the
state governments. There was considerable development
of reciprocal legislation before the early 1930's29 and the
development of the single place of taxation policy under
the First National Bank of Boston v. Maine29 a line of cases,
but the Supreme Court decisions of the early 1930's relaxed this development since those decisions made such
reciprocal legislation and compacts unnecessary.
155: Anno.-Personal Property-Situs for Taxation, supra, n. 6, Brown,
The Present Status of Multiple Taxation of Intangible Property (1942) 42
Mich. L. Rev. 806.
23 308 U. S. 1 (1939).
26 Ibid, 15.
26, Supra, n. 17.
27 Supra, n. 17, 181.
28 Ibid, 184.
28 Discussed by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in State
Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, ibid, 197. See also, supra, n. 24.

29, Su ra, n. 9.
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In conclusion, it would be of value to discuss briefly
the problems of multistate taxation of intangibles that confront the taxpayer, and to draw some conclusions as to
the contacts which may be sufficient to enable states to
tax intangibles or some interest thereof constitutionally.
In view of the fact that the Supreme Court opinions have
passed through a cycle in regard to the extension of the
due process clause to the constitutionality of multiple
state taxation, it is often necessary to consider at what
part of the cycle a specific case was decided in order to
evaluate to what extent that case may be considered as
applicable under the present Supreme Court holdings as
represented
by Curry v. McCanlesDb and the Aldrich
29
case. c
No attempt will be made at this time to collect or annotate all the cases on the taxability of intangibles or on
the interests thereof, but a general review of the leading
cases should be given to show the scope of the problem
that the taxpayer faces in attempting to minimize multiple
state taxation.
As was pointed out in the opinion of Greenough case,
the domiciliary state of the owner may impose property
taxes on intangibles regardless of where the evidences of
ownership may be. ° Promissory notes executed by a nonresident and left by a non-resident testator in a safe deposit box within the taxing state have been held assessable under a death transfer tax." The state of "commercial
domicile"-the place where a foreign corporation maintains its general offices 32 -and the state where a "business
situs" of stock issued by a foreign corporation and owned
by foreign stockholders is maintained 33 have been permitted to tax. The domicile of a corporation can levy a death
transfer tax on stock owned by a non-resident and held
outside of the taxing state.34 A property tax on intangibles
imposed by the domiciliary state of a corporation whose
"business situs" is in a foreign state has been held constitutional.3 5
Supra, n. 12.
Supra, n. 17.
10 Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U. S. 54
(1917) ; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928).
81 Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434 (1914).
32 Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 -(1936); The Present
Status of Multiple Taoation of Intangible Property, supra, n. 24.
"aFirst Bank Stock Corporation v. Minnesota, 201 U. S. 234 (1937).
3, Supra, n. 17.
88 Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U. S. 313
"g

(1939).
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The discouraging complexities of the multiple state
taxation problem have even more variations within the
field of trusts. In addition to many of the situations already mentioned in the previous paragraph, the state
taxation of trust interests can be again subdivided if the
equitable interest of the beneficiary and the legal interest
of the trustee are not within the same state. The decisions
as to whether the equitable interest of a foreign trust,
created by a non-resident testator and administered by a
non-resident trustee, could be taxed were to the effect
that the equitable interest of intangibles in such a case
could not be so taxed.36 But the companion cases of Curry
v. McCanless, and Graves v. Elliott 7 decided in 1939
changed this rule. Under these two decisions and the
memorandum decision of Stewart v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania," a state where only the beneficiary resides
may be able to tax. The exercise of the general testamentary power of appointment by a resident donee of the
power is taxable.3 Probably the state in which the trust
is administered can impose a tax." The relinquishment by
the death of a domiciled resident of the taxing state of a
power to revoke or to appoint new beneficiaries of a foreign
trust of intangibles held by a non-resident trustee is taxable even though the power was never exercised. 41 The
Greenough case, hereinbefore discussed, held that a state
could assess an ad valorem personal property tax on a resident co-trustee where the state's only contact with the
trust was the mere residence of a co-trustee within the
state and where the resident trustee had in no way utilized the taxing state's courts in regard to trust matters.
In addition to the above possible combinations of multiple state taxation, there is also the possibility that, if there
are a number of trustees all of whom live in different
states, each resident state of the respective trustees might
be able to tax the trust res in the form of a personal property tax to the full extent of the trust. This rather unnerving suggestion is pointed out by Mr. Justice Jackson
in his dissent 42 in the Greenough case. In addition the
double domicile type of situation as illustrated by the
26 Brooke v. City of Norfolk, 277 U. S. 27 (1928) ; Safe Deposit and Trust
Company v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929) ; see also Baltimore v. Gibbs, 166
Md. 364, 171 A. 37 (1933).
37 307 U. S. 383 (1939).
38312 U. S. 649 (1941).
"Graves v. Schmldlapp, 315 U. S. 657 (1942).
,0 See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936).
"1supra, n. 87.
" Supra, n. 5, 1407.
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Dorrance case43 could possibly arise in regard to any one
of the trustees or beneficiaries.
Because of the possibility that the various taxable interests of a trust may be spread over several states and
that each of the states having taxing power over such interests may possibly tax to the full value of the trust
estate, settlors should exercise care in drawing up the
trust. The settlor may be wise to confine the elements of
his trust to one state as much as possible; the state in which
the beneficiary resides may well be the preferable state.
But at best this is only a first approach to the problem on
the assumption that the beneficiaries and trustees will remain in the state in which they presently reside. What
if one of the trustees or one of the beneficiaries subsequently takes up a new domicile in another state? Might
this not subject the trust to the additional taxing power
of that state? This danger of multistate taxation subsequently caused by the moving of the trustees or the
beneficiaries could be guarded against by drawing the
trust agreement with express elastic powers to move the
trust res into another state if necessary or to give the trustees the power to supplant a trustee if the latter sets up
a domicile outside of the state in which the interests of the
trust have been concentrated.
Is In Re Dorrance's Will, 333 Pa. 162, 3 A. 2d 682 (1939). See also,
State of Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398 (1939).

